Industry speculation is that such technologies may spur higher demand for online advertising, but that these technologies will benefit general outlets more than local newspapers. The resolution of these demand and supply effects depends upon how targeting alters the incentives of the general outlet in choosing its advertising space. When such space can be freely chosen (that is, there are no costs in expanding ad space or consumer disutility from ads) and when advertisers are not themselves capacity constrained, we demonstrate that an appropriately chosen expansion of ad space is a perfect substitute for targeting. That is, the adoption of such technologies does not alter prices or equilibrium profits. We then analyze three extensions of the model in which targeting does benefit general outlets: advertising space is limited or costly; there is heterogeneity across local media markets; or advertisers are capacity-constrained (creating competition between outlets on the advertising-side of the industry). Even in these cases, however, the impact of targeting is mitigated by the fact that when targeting is introduced, it is optimal for outlets to cut back on their supply of ad space.
Our formal analysis focuses on the case where the market shares of outlets are exogenous. Clearly, the higher are the profits per consumer, the more the outlets are willing to invest in their quality, expanding their market shares. When targeting increases general outlet ad avoidance (Justin Johnson, 2009 ). An independent and complementary paper by Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro
Bonatti (2009) is a notable exception; taking supply as exogenous, that paper develops a model of tailored media content and explores a number of comparative statics about the impact of targeting on advertising demand. 3 profits at the expense of local ones, we expect equilibrium market shares of outlets (and/or outlet survival, given the need to cover fixed costs) to move in the same direction as profits.
I. Baseline Model
Our model involves a set of localities
with N consumers in each locality, M local media outlets (one for each locality), and a single general outlet (g). Consumers (exogenously) visit only one outlet, either their own local outlet or the general outlet; in the terminology of the two-sided market literature, they single-home. Under condition (S), we let n l denote each locality's readership for its local outlet.
Each advertiser i is also local and so it does not value advertising impressions for consumers outside its market. In our baseline case, we make the following assumption:
(CV) Per-consumer advertiser value, v i , is invariant to the number of consumers. This condition will hold if the advertisers are not capacity constrained and have constant marginal cost. Multiple impressions on the same consumer are wasted, but outlets track consumers so that only one impression per consumer is offered to each advertiser. There is a continuum of advertisers with values drawn from [0, 1] 
has a choice over the number of ads, a j , that can be impressed on a consumer. Advertisers are assumed to bid for ad space and so will be rationed according to value with the marginal advertiser, v j being defined by 1 ( )
II. Tailoring versus Targeting in the Baseline Model
We now turn to solve for the equilibrium in the advertising market under condition (CV).
Each outlet selects its supply of ad space.
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Let p j denote the impression price of outlet j. Note that (CV) implies that outlet decisions are independent of one another, so each outlet focuses on its own inventory decisions in isolation and our results are invariant to the number of outlets.
On the demand side, advertisers will purchase impressions on an outlet if To understand this result, it is instructive to compare the impression prices for local and general outlets. First is the demand-side efficiency effect: advertisements in the general outlet are priced lower because they are less productive than those in the local outlet whose consumers all come from a particular locality. Second is the supply-side scarcity effect: without targeting, for a fixed level of advertising space, the supply of advertisements by the general outlet to a particular locality is reduced because a market's advertisers compete for that outlet's scarce advertising space with advertisers from other localities. This pushes up prices on the general outlet.
The balance of the effectiveness and scarcity effects determines whether tailoring is, indeed, a driver of greater profitability or not. Suppose for a moment that a g is fixed and exogenous. Then, the global outlet earns higher prices (and profits) with targeting if
(1)
To understand the condition, note that the first 1/M on the right-hand side reflects the efficiency effect. The factor 1/M in the second term reflects scarcity: without targeting, / g a M advertisers from a given locality purchase advertisements, while with targeting, to fill the same space, g a advertisers from a single locality purchase advertisements.
, and so that the targeting profits are higher unless a g is fairly high (for the case of M=2, at least 2/3, which is higher than 1/2, the optimal level of a g with targeting).
When the general outlet chooses its advertising space g a in each case, in the absence of targeting it expands advertising space to M times what a local outlet would provide.
Consequently, it serves the same range of advertisers, although to do this it charge a price of 1/M of the price it would charge with targeting. Although impressions are wasted on mis-matched consumers, the general outlet replicates the local outlet (monopoly, due to (CV)) outcomes.
III. Constraints or costs to the outlets of advertising space
Our baseline case demonstrates that targeting is not so much a substitute for tailoring (in terms of allowing more effective ads) but a mechanism that allows an outlet to achieve outcomes without wasted impressions. When there is no cost to providing those impressions, there is no return to adopting targeting. Of course, advertising space may be costly in terms of direct costs (e.g., printing and bandwidth) but also in terms of opportunity cost (e.g., deterrence of readers who may have a disutility associated with advertising clutter). In that case, targeting would save those costs. To keep things simple, we incorporate the costs of advertising space using a constraint, but the results are qualitatively similar when there is a cost of advertising space. The proof is a straightforward implication of the fact that the optimal levels of advertising for the global outlet with and without targeting are such that profits are equal between the two, but when the global outlet is too constrained to increase its output enough to compensate for the inefficiency of its impressions, its profits fall. The welfare implication arises from the fact that targeting allows more advertisers to be accommodated by the general outlet for a given advertising space constraint. This also means that the private return to adopting targeting technology is less than the social returns. This suggests issues for platforms trying to promote such technologies and their diffusion; something we leave for future research. 
IV. Heterogeneous demand across localities

